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Résumé : 
La loi américaine « Sarbanes-Oxley » est 
perçue comme une réponse légitime à la 
crise importante dans les marchés 
financiers.  Pas très reconnu est le fait 
que l’emphase de la loi sur la 
reconstitution de la crédibilité aux 
marchés financiers trahit un engagement 
idéologique profond à l'entretien du 
système capitaliste. Récemment, 
plusieurs mouvements réactionnaires 
émergeaient qui expriment leur 
opposition à la loi « Sarbanes-Oxley ». 
Ces efforts contredisent l'intention de la 
loi de reconstituer la crédibilité aux 
marchés financiers.  Cet article décrit 
certains de ces mouvements 
réactionnaires et les arguments 
idéologiques avancés. 
 
Mot clés : « Sarbanes Oxley Act », 
l’indépendance des commissaires aux 
comptes, l’idéologie 
Abstract:  
The American law called the “Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002” has been viewed as a 
legitimate response to a major crisis in 
the capital markets.  Not often 
acknowledged is that the law’s emphasis 
on restoring credibility to the capital 
markets betrays a deep ideological 
commitment to maintenance of the 
capitalist system.  Recently, several 
reactionary movements have emerged 
which express their opposition to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act. These efforts 
appear to contradict the law’s intent of 
restoring credibility to the capital 
markets.  This paper describes certain of 
these reactionary movements and the 
ideological claims that are advanced.  
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Introduction 
An ideology can be defined as a comprehensive set of beliefs about political, economic, and 
social affairs which is held in common by a group of people within a society (Johnson, 2005).  
Ideologies claim to explain how political, economic, social and cultural institutions work and 
prescribe how they should work. For example, conservative ideologies seek to demonstrate a 
correspondence between ‘the way things are’ and ‘the way things ought to be,’ thus legitimizing 
the existing order (see for example, Watts and Zimmerman, 1978).  Progressive ideologies, on 
the other hand, envision a more legitimate and supportable social-economic-political system and 
seek to demonstrate that the existing order does meet those standards, thereby de-legitimizing the 
existing system (Neu et al., 2001).  In an ideological sense, the term reactionary has often been 
used to describe persons who are ideologically conservative, especially if they want to reverse 
(or prevent) certain forms of progressive social change.  As a term of opprobrium, reactionary 
was used throughout the nineteenth century to refer to groups who wanted to preserve 
aristocratic privileges in the face of increasing republicanism and classical liberalism (Austin, 
1922).  Marxists have also used the term in a dialectical sense to refer to those who stand in 
opposition to revolutionary socialism (Lenin, 1972).  In a more general sense, the term 
reactionary can be applied to any political actor who attempts to reverse progressive social 
change (Wikipedia, 2006).  It is this latter sense that is employed in this paper.  
It is important to recall that the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) was enacted by an 
ideologically conservative Republican Congress and an ideologically conservative Republican 
President in an attempt to calm the public’s outrage over a series of highly publicized and 
politically sensitive business and accounting scandals (Bumiller, 2002).  Despite its seemingly 
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conservative origin, SOX has been viewed as a piece of progressive legislation because it has 
helped to improve the transparency of financial reporting and the independence of auditors in the 
United States (Serwer, 2006).  SOX will be five years old on July 30, 2007, and it is therefore a 
good time to review the impact and effects of this law.  During the first several years after its 
enactment there was a considerable amount of criticism of the law, but there was little effort 
directed towards its repeal or modification.  Now it appears that several groups have been 
mounting efforts to reduce the effects of SOX or to repeal it outright.  This paper looks at the 
ideological positions of four different groups that are either opposed to or critical of SOX, 
including: financial executives, ‘free-market’ political forces, academic accounting researchers, 
and non-US based commentators.  The efforts of these groups to reduce the effects of SOX will 
be discussed later in the paper. First, the basic provisions of the law will be summarized in order 
to set the stage for assessing the ideological positions of the different groups that have been 
mounting attacks against it.   
The Scope of SOX 
SOX has been described as ‘ground breaking’ legislation, both because for its creation of new 
institutional structures for the regulation of public accountancy, but also for its expansive scope, 
which touches upon many different actors in the capital markets (Stephens and Schwartz, 2006; 
Serwer, 2006).  The law includes 11 titles comprising over 60 sections.  Table 1 provides a 
summary of 9 of the 11 titles and 48 of the 60 sections.  These titles and sections affect different 
actors in different ways.  Among the various sections there are provisions dealing with auditors 
and public accounting firms, corporations and their officers and directors, the Financial 
Accounting Standards Board (FASB), financial analysts, securities lawyers, financial analysts 
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and investment banks.  Perhaps the most important aspect of the law, from the perspective of the 
public accounting profession, is found in Title 1, which created the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board (PCAOB) (see Table 1).  
*** Insert Table 1*** 
The PCAOB is a quasi-governmental entity operating under the aegis of the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC).  However, it supported by independent funding provided through 
fees charged to companies that issue securities according to the US federal securities laws (SEC 
issuers).  Section 102 of SOX specifies that all public accounting firms engaged to audit SEC 
issuers must register with the PCAOB.  The larger sized accounting firms (those with more than 
100 audit clients) must have their audit practices inspected annually by the PCAOB.  The 
PCAOB has the authority to censure, fine or suspend an accounting firm that violates its 
standards, rules or regulations.  The PCAOB also has the power to issue auditing standards, 
quality control standards, independence standards and ethics standards for registered public 
accounting firms. In essence, SOX removed self-regulation from the American public accounting 
profession (Defond ad Francis, 2005).  In addition, via a provision that has been controversial 
due to its extra-territorial nature, Section 106 of SOX requires any foreign accounting firm that 
audits an SEC issuer, or a subsidiary of an SEC issuer, to register with the SEC.    
Title II of SOX addresses auditor independence by prohibiting certain types of non-audit services 
if they are provided to audit clients (e.g. bookkeeping; information systems design and 
implementation; actuarial services; appraisal or valuation; internal audit; human resources; 
investment banking; legal services)(section 201).  Title II also requires mandatory audit partner 
rotation (section 203); mandatory audit reports to audit committees (section 204); and prohibits 
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auditors from being hired as financial officers of an audit client for a period of one year (section 
206).  
Title III of SOX focuses on corporate governance.  Section 301 requires the creation of 
independent audit committees of boards of directors.  Section 302 requires the Chief Executive 
Officer and the Chief Financial Officer to certify the annual and quarterly reports of the SEC 
issuer.  This certification must cover not only the fair presentation of the company’s financial 
condition and results of operations, but also any significant deficiencies in internal control and 
also any fraud. Section 303 makes it unlawful to influence, coerce or mislead an auditor.  Section 
306 prohibits officers and directors from purchasing or selling securities during blackout periods, 
and Section 307 requires the SEC to issues rules of profession conduct for attorneys practicing 
before the SEC. 
Title IV of SOX has been the primary target of financial executives.  Section 404 requires the 
annual report of each issuer to include an internal control report which acknowledges the 
responsibility of management for establishing and maintaining an adequate system of internal 
control and also a report on the effectiveness of the internal control.  The auditor must issue an 
opinion on management’s assessment of internal control, and an opinion regarding the 
effectiveness of the internal control. 
In summary, the most significant attempts to modify or repeal SOX have come from 
corporations that are reluctant to implement effective internal control, or those that complain that 
the cost of implementing effective internal control is too high.  Another type of attack comes 
from ‘free-market’ political forces that have allied themselves with smaller accounting firms, 
who in turn allege that the provisions of SOX hamper their business practices.  A third type of 
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criticism comes from academic researchers who claim that there is no evidence to support the 
provisions of SOX and that the law was politically motivated.   A final form of complaint comes 
from non-US based accounting professionals and regulators (principally British) who fear that 
SOX-like laws may be enacted in their countries, and who also claims that laws like SOX are not 
needed because of the superiority of their legal and regulatory structures.  Many of these critics 
are also aware of the competitive advantage experienced by capital markets that are not required 
to comply with the high standards of financial reporting mandated by SOX.   Each of these areas 
of critique will be discussed in the following sections.           
Financial Executives’ Criticisms of SOX 
Criticisms of SOX from financial executives have been focused on Section 404 which requires 
public corporations to issue an annual internal control report clearly stating the responsibility of 
management to establish adequate internal control.  The report must contain management’s 
assessment of the effectiveness of internal control. The company’s external auditors must issue 
an opinion regarding management’s assessment of internal control, and the auditor must also 
issue an opinion regarding the effectiveness of internal control as part of the normal audit 
engagement. The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of Financial Executives 
International (FEI), an organization of Chief Financial Officers, Controllers, Treasurers, and 
other financial executives, has issued several comment letters criticizing Section 404.  The 
following is an extract from one letter to the SEC dated April 1, 2005: 
 
“The Committee on Corporate Reporting (CCR) of Financial Executives International 
(FEI) is pleased to provide feedback regarding the implementation of Section 404 
(Section 404) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (the Act) relating to internal control over 
financial reporting. Now that we have gone through the first run of this compliance effort, 
we agree that it’s time to review what we have learned and identify ways to improve the 
annual process going forward. We are encouraged by the Commission’s willingness to 
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solicit such feedback. FEI was one of the first business associations that supported the 
Act. We believe that many aspects of the Act, including Section 404, have enhanced 
investor confidence in our financial reporting and disclosure practices, corporate 
governance and auditor independence. As one of the sponsoring organizations of COSO, 
FEI has long supported the notion that having effective internal controls over financial 
reporting is vital to the integrity of financial reporting. We do not see the need for an 
overhaul of the legislation, just greater balance in implementing the regulations and 
guidance. While this was a useful exercise in many respects, it cost much more than 
originally projected. In a March 2005 survey of 217 companies, FEI found member 
companies spent an average of $4.3 million for added internal costs and additional fees 
spent on Companies over $25 billion in revenue spent more, $14.7 million on average. 
According to the survey, employees logged an average of 26,758 hours to comply with 
the regulation, some dramatically more. Additionally, 94 percent of the respondents to 
our survey indicated that the costs far outweighed the benefits” (Brod, 2005).  
 
This quotation contains several different ideological claims.  First, the FEI committee stresses its 
willingness to support SOX and to cooperate with the SEC.  They express the belief that many 
aspects of the law have enhanced investor confidence in financial reporting and auditor 
independence, thereby aligning themselves not only with the legal purposes of the SEC but also 
with the dominant capitalist ideology which focuses on the need to maintain confidence in the 
capital markets.  However, FEI goes on to complain that the costs of implementing Section 404 
far outweigh the benefits.  Thus, it is a mixed ideological message which follows the refrain: ‘the 
law is good, but it costs too much.’  This is an interesting point, because if confidence in the 
capital market is important, how much should increasing this confidence costs? Apparently, FEI 
believes that the cost is too high, but they do not indicate what amount that would be sufficient 
or appropriate.    
 
Partly in response to the ideological claims advanced by FEI, the big four accounting firms (i.e. 
Deloitte & Touche LLP, Ernst & Young LLP, KPMG LLP, and PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP) 
engaged CRA International Inc. (CRA) to survey corporations about the costs of implementing 
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Section 404.  The most recent survey was published in spring 2006.  This survey includes an 
analysis of the costs of Section 404 and related audit fees, derived from proxy materials.  Table 2 
is adapted from the CRA survey.  Table 2 indicates that the costs of implementing Section 404 
have declined. 
*** Insert Table 2*** 
Thus, it can be seen that while the criticisms of Section 404 concerning the costs of 
implementing Section 404 may have been factual, the costs are actually declining, thereby 
raising questions about the argument of the FEI that the costs outweigh the benefits.  In a 
counter-argument which defends SOX against those who have been critical about its cost, 
Senator Paul Sarbanes is quoted as saying: 
“These people have already forgotten what happened at Enron and WorldCom. People 
lost all their pensions and retirement savings. The bill is really about ensuring that public 
companies have a legitimate system of internal financial controls. To me that is a 
worthwhile cost” (Serwer, 2006).  
It is evident that a very different ideological position is being advance by Senator Sarbanes.  He 
is not interested in restoring credibility to the capital markets, but rather he is interested in 
establishing a legitimate system of internal control so that individuals do not lose their pensions 
and retirement savings.  This is a more progressive ideological position than simply restoring 
credibility to the capital markets.  While Senator Sarbanes might agree with the argument that 
confidence in the capital markets is important for the success of a capitalist society, he places his 
emphasis on the welfare of individuals who have been damaged by corporate scandals.    
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Attacks on SOX by ‘Free Market’ Forces  
In February 2006, the Free Enterprise Fund (FEF), an advocacy group headed by Mallory 
Factor, a Republican fundraiser, filed a federal lawsuit in the United States District Court for the 
District of Columbia which characterized SOX as “a dramatic expansion of regulatory power 
that has ultimately failed in achieving the intended objectives” (Free Enterprise Fund, 2006).  
FEF has made no secret of the fact that the objective of its lawsuit is the repeal of SOX (Myers, 
2006a). The lawsuit argues that the creation of the PCAOB was unconstitutional.  In their 
complaint, the FEF stated that: 
“This is an action challenging the formation and operation of the Public Company 
Accounting Oversight Board (the Board), an entity created by the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 
2002 (the Act) to ‘oversee the audit of public companies that are subject to the securities 
laws.’ In carrying out this mandate, the Board is authorized to and does exercise broad 
governmental power, including the power to enforce compliance with the Act and the 
securities laws, to regulate the conduct of auditors through rulemaking and adjudication, 
and to set its own budget and to fund its own operations by fixing and levying a tax on 
the nation’s public companies. As a result, and notwithstanding the Act’s effort to 
characterize the Board as a private corporation, the Board is a government entity subject 
to the limits of the United States Constitution, including the Constitution’s separation of 
powers principles and the requirements of the Appointments Clause. The Board’s 
structure and operation, including its freedom from Presidential oversight and control and 
the method by which its members are appointed, contravene these principles and 
requirements. For this reason, the Board and all power and authority exercised by it 
violate the Constitution” (Free Enterprise Fund, 2006, page 2). 
FEF went on to describe itself on page 4 of the complaint as follows: 
“FEF is a non-profit public-interest organization under Section 501(c)(4) of the Internal 
Revenue Code with offices in the District of Columbia. FEF promotes economic growth, 
lower taxes, and limited government through television and radio issue advertising 
campaigns, providing timely and tactical policy guidance to members of Congress and 
publishing strategic game plans on vital economic and fiscal issues. In bringing this 
lawsuit, FEF seeks to vindicate the interests of its members, who are subject to the 
Board’s authority and have been injured by the regulations imposed by the Board” (Free 
Enterprise Fund, 2006, page 4). 
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While it is clear from this quotation that FEF supports a neo-liberal ideological position, its 
position has been masked by the argument that the PCAOB is unconstitutional.  This is a legal 
argument which will be decided ultimately by the federal court.  The PCAOB has asked the court 
to dismiss the lawsuit (Myers, 2006b).  On June 29, 2006 a federal judge heard arguments in the 
case (Wutkowski, 2006).  There has been no resolution to date.    
 
While FEF is a political advocacy group with a neo-liberal ideological agenda, and consequently 
it might expected that it would oppose SOX purely on ideological grounds, the second plaintiff 
in the lawsuit is a public accounting firm named Beckstead and Watts. On page 5 of the 
complaint, Beckstead and Watts described itself as a firm that specializes in audits of small 
publicly traded corporations (Free Enterprise Fund, 2006, page 5).  On page 18, Beckstead and 
Watts claims the following: 
“Seven inspectors from the PCAOB visited Beckstead and Watt’s offices over a two-
week period, from May 17 to 28, 2004. These inspectors evaluated Beckstead and 
Watts’s audits in the same manner that one would evaluate the audits of a Fortune 1000 
company, notwithstanding the costs issues and the relative benefits (or lack thereof) to 
the investing public of applying such strict standards to this segment of the marketplace. 
Applying the Board’s standards in such a manner, the Board’s inspectors identified 
numerous auditing deficiencies with respect to Beckstead and Watts’s audits of its 
clients.  The Board prepared a draft inspection report and permitted Beackstead and 
Watts to comment upon it. In an effort to remedy some of the defects identified by the 
Board, Beckstead and Watts reduced the number of clients with which it had an auditor 
relationship from over sixty SEC-reporting companies to just over ten. This reduction in 
Beckstead and Watts’s public company client base led to a further reduction in Beckstead 
and Watts’s revenues and profits for the fiscal year ended 2005 as compared to the fiscal 
year ended 2004” (Free Enterprise Fund, 2006, p. 18). 
 
The ideological position expressed in this quotation differs from that of FEF.  Whereas, FEF is 
primarily concerned with promoting ‘free-enterprise’ and ‘limited government’ (a neo-liberal 
ideological position), Beckstead and Watt is concerned with its own financial future.  The firm 
describes the high costs of complying with the law, and they assert that these costs outweigh the 
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benefits from applying strict standards to small audit firms and small companies.  Again, this is a 
mixed ideological message.  On the one hand, there is an argument that costs outweigh the 
benefits.  This is an argument without supporting evidence, because no effort has been made to 
assess the benefits derived from greater confidence in the capital markets.  Furthermore, there is 
a logical inconsistency in arguing that smaller companies should be exempted from regulation.  
This argument presupposes that the users of small company financial statements are not entitled 
to have confidence in the reliability of financial statements, and that only the shareholders of 
large companies are entitled to such confidence.  
 
Apart from the direct assault on SOX contained in the FEF lawsuit, there have recent been 
political efforts by certain American Congressmen to reduce the effects of SOX (Rothstein, 
2006).  Representative Tom Feeney (R-Florida), a member of the House Financial Services 
Committee, and Representative Pete Sessions (R-Texas), who sits on the House Budget 
Committee, expressed the intention to introduce legislation in 2007 when Senator Sarbanes and 
Representative Oxley were no longer in Congress.  Because the control of Congress changed 
hands in the November 2006, these congressmen were not able to introduce their proposed 
legislation.  The legislation would have made Section 404 voluntary for companies with market 
capitalizations less than $700 million.  The legislation would have also required the SEC to set 
the materiality threshold for the identification of significant deficiencies in internal control at 
five percent of a company’s gross sales.  These two provisions would exempt most SEC issuers 
from complying with Section 404.  The ideological positions of the two Representatives were 
based on the belief that complying with SOX would be too costly for small businesses.  In a 
forum held by FEF in April 2006, the Representatives stated that the effect of SOX’s internal 
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control accounting requirements on small businesses was a ‘crisis that can no longer be ignored’ 
(Rothstein, 2006).  They went on to state: 
“Capital is fleeing America largely because of Sarbanes-Oxley. The London Stock 
Exchange, to their credit, travels the world and advertises itself as Sarbanes Oxley free. 
Their No. 1 selling point is ‘we’re SOX free’ (Rothstein, 2006). 
 
Again, this is a mixed ideological message because the Representatives claim that the costs of 
complying with SOX are too high for small businesses, while at the same time they assert that 
there is unfair competition coming from countries with less stringent laws.  The first part of the 
message argues that there should be relief from the provisions of SOX for smaller companies 
because the costs are too high.  This argument appeals to the idea of fairness, with the implicit 
assumption that there would be little damage done to capital markets as a result of providing 
relief for smaller companies.  In contrast, the second part of the message argues that foreign 
capital markets permit companies to issue financial statements without proper internal controls, 
and that to be competitive, US companies should be allowed to issue financial statements 
without proper internal controls.  The first part of the message asserts that the costs outweigh the 
benefits (a testable assumption), while the second part of the messages says, ‘everyone else is 
doing it, so why not us’.  This latter argument is morally repugnant.       
 
Finally, with respect to attacks on SOX by ‘free-market’ forces, it should  be recalled that the 
current chairman of the SEC, Christopher Cox, was a Republican member of Congress for 17 
years before being appointed to be the SEC Chairman by President George Bush.  Chairman Cox 
has a record of supporting conservative and neo-liberal ideological positions.  Given the 
combination of a federal lawsuit claiming that SOX is unconstitutional, the possible emergence 
of legislation that would exempt most companies from complying with Section 404 of SOX, and 
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an SEC Chairman with a neo-liberal ideology, it seems probable that there may be modifications 
to SOX in the near future.   
Criticisms of SOX by Academic Accounting Researchers 
As, Tinker et al. (1982, 1991) and Williams (1987) have pointed out, accounting researchers are 
not neutral with respect to the subject matter of their research efforts.  Accounting and auditing 
researchers have often reached conclusions that support the positions of large accounting firms 
and corporations in general.  For example, with regard to audit research focusing on SOX, 
DeFond and Francis make the following comment: 
 “While historically the auditing profession is often intensely criticized following boom-
bust economic cycles, the criticism embodied in SOX is unusually intense and appears to 
be partially motivated by political expedience and often based on anecdotes” (Defond and 
Francis, 2005, p. 6). 
 “We believe that the SOX provision that bans most nonaudit services is at best 
misguided, and at worst politically-motivated” (Defond and Francis, 2005, p. 6). 
 “There are no theories that explain why boards of directors exist, much less why audit 
committees exist” (Defond and Francis, 2005, p. 7). 
 “Section 404 of SOX is anticipated to increase audit fees by 50-100 percent.  Are there 
measurable benefits in audit quality that would justify these fee increases?” (Defond and 
Francis, 2005, p. 8). 
These accounting researchers have criticized SOX, asserting that its provisions are misguided or 
politically motivated and that there is a lack of evidence supporting the efficacy of the 
provisions.  However, the measure of efficacy that the researchers employ is the relevance of the 
provisions to the capital markets.  This is an ideological position because the underlying premise 
is that the only reason for SOX to exist is to provide more reliable information to the capital 
markets.  Even if this premise is correct, the type of methodology employed by these researchers 
(i.e. investigation of relationships between archived economic data and accounting data) is often 
 14 
incapable of detecting market reactions to new regulations, such as management certification of 
the effectiveness of internal control (Bhattacharya et al., 2002), rotation of audit partners (Myers 
et al., 2003), prohibition of non-audit services (Frankel et al., 2002), and independent audit 
committees (Bhagat and Black, 1999). The reason for the inability to detect share price reactions 
is that the methodology cannot distinguish between a market reaction to the new regulation and 
other types of noise in the capital markets. Accounting researchers rarely employ sociological or 
political science research methods that might be better for investigating questions pertaining to 
the efficacy of laws and regulation, consequently the researchers are often unable to answer the 
questions that are of most interest to public policy makers.  Moreover, a complete reliance on the 
criterion of market relevance ignores a principal motivation of Senator Sarbanes when proposing 
the law, which was to prevent corporations from fraudulently destroying the pension rights of 
employees.     
Criticisms of SOX by Non-US Commentators 
 
Prior to the enactment of SOX, the government of the United Kingdom lobbied the US 
Government in order to try to limit the effects of the law.  The ideological implications of these 
lobbying efforts were revealed in the following exchange that took place in the House of Lords 
on July 29, 2002,  
Lord Sharman: My Lords, I beg leave to ask the question standing in my name on the 
Order Paper. In so doing, I declare an interest as a paid adviser to KPMG. The question is 
as follows: ‘To ask Her Majesty's Government whether they will make representations to 
the United States government to limit the extraterritorial effect of Senator Sarbanes’ bill 
regarding the regulation of auditors.’  
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Trade and Industry 
(Lord Sainsbury of Turville): My Lords, high-level representations were made to the 
United States Government about the extra-territorial effect of the proposed Sarbane bill 
by the United Kingdom Government and by the European Commission. The Accounting 
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Bill, which combines elements of both the Sarbanes and the Oxley bills, is expected to be 
signed by President Bush this week. We believe that our lobbying has had some success, 
but concerns about the legislation remain. We are therefore continuing to pursue these 
matters at national and European level with the US administration.  
Lord Sharman: My Lords, I thank the Minister for that very helpful reply. Does he 
agree, however, that the proven system of regulation in operation in the banking 
industry—so-called host country regulation—is much preferable to the extra-territorial 
application of any state's legislation?  
Lord Sainsbury of Turville: My Lords, without wishing to give a definitive view about 
the Government’s approach to international regulatory matters, I should say that we do 
not want to see extra regulatory burdens piled on British companies. In particular, we do 
not want an additional layer of regulatory burden to be placed on UK audit firms which 
are already subject to an extensive regulatory regime in the UK (Lord Sharman, 2002). 
This exchange reveals several different ideological perspectives.  The first perspective is 
demonstrated by Lord Sharman’s revelation that he was a paid adviser to KPMG.  Any 
statements made after this revelation could be seen as self-serving representations by an 
accounting firm which did not want to be constrained by SOX.  Compounding this self-serving 
ideological perspective was the response of the UK government which sought to assure Lord 
Sharman that the government was trying its best to make sure that UK firms would not be 
subject to the provisions of SOX.  One might then ask, if an accounting firm were seeking to 
perform an audit of a company with shares listed in the United States, why should they not be 
subject to US regulation?  Are the users of the financial statements of a US based multinational 
company not entitled to the same level of protection as the shareholders of a strictly domestic 
company?  The argument that UK audit firms and companies are subject to an extensive 
regulatory regime in the UK is misleading because of the ample evidence of lower levels of 
regulatory stringency in certain London based capital markets.  Moreover, the London Stock 
Exchange has been aggressively marketing its Alternative Investment Market to both US and 
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non-US companies by advertising the lower levels of regulation required for listing in the UK 
(McLachlan, 2006).   
The ideological perspectives underlying criticisms of SOX by non-US commentators can also be 
seen in a position paper published by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales (ICAEW) in which it was stated: 
 “The principle underpinning the UK financial reporting regime is intuitively more 
straightforward as it relates to the furtherance of the aims of the corporation. The 
accounting disclosure question to be answered is ‘what would the shareholder want to 
know about how well a company is being run on its resources?’ This is very different, 
legally and economically, from the US principle of fraud on the market.  To comply with 
the 1933 Securities Act the question to be answered is ‘what does the market need to 
know?’” (Bush, 2005). 
The author of the ICAEW position paper criticizes the ideological perspective underlying SOX 
and other US securities laws which concentrates on maintaining the credibility of capital 
markets.  However, the author does not recognize his own ideological perspective which elevates 
the ‘aims of the corporation’ and ‘what the shareholder wants to know’ above the interests of 
others in society, including participants in the capital markets.  The author admits that there is no 
easy way under British Common Law for capital market participants to sue for loss of market 
value arising from fraudulent or misleading financial statements (Bush, 2005, p. 55).  One might 
therefore ask, what is the purpose of regulating the issuance of audited financial statements under 
British law?   
The author of the ICAEW position paper goes on to compound his lack of insight into his own 
ideological position by claiming that: “Major differences exist between the United States and the 
rest of the world regarding both the preparation of financial statements and corporate governance 
matters” (Bush, 2005, p. 2), thus implying that the UK system of audit regulation and corporate 
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governance is comparable to that of the rest of the world.  That this assertion is not correct can be 
easily demonstrated by reference to an article in Comptabilité-Contrôle-Audit, the journal of the 
Francophone Accounting Association, in which it was observed that the French Law of Financial 
Security of August 1, 2003, was enacted after SOX with the express purpose of restoring trust in 
the capital markets (Cappelletti, 2006).  The Law of Financial Security (LFS) introduced a new 
set of shareholder reporting obligations focusing on the internal controls of French corporations 
(Cappelletti, 2006, p. 28).  Many of the provisions of LFS are similar to those of SOX.  For 
example, LFS requires the CEO of a French company to issue a report on the company’s internal 
control in a separate report attached to the audit report.  The external auditors must also provide a 
report on the CEO’s internal control report in an attachment to their audit report.   
Commenting on the similarities between SOX and LFS, Cappelletti quotes Wirtz (2005), who 
argues that both SOX and LFS are evidence of a growing trend towards international 
standardization of financial reporting and corporate governance practices whereby companies are 
experiencing diverse pressures that seek to obtain conformity with ‘best practices’ of corporate 
governance.  Thus, there appears to be a greater degree of convergence between French and 
American law and regulations regarding financial reporting and corporate governance than in the 
UK.  This may be because the recent trend toward regulatory legalism in the United States has 
been present in France for many years (Puxty el al., 1987).  In summary, there appears to be a 
considerable amount of international standardization of financial reporting and corporate 
governance practices, with SOX often serving as a model for such convergence.        
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Conclusion              
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 has been generally viewed as a progressive piece of legislation 
which was enacted in response to a significant crisis in the capital markets.  At the same time, the 
law’s primary emphasis on restoring credibility to the capital markets reveals a deep ideological 
commitment to maintaining the capitalist system.  Somewhat surprisingly, several reactionary 
movements have emerged in recent years in opposition to SOX.  These movements have 
advanced positions which are contradictory to the law’s intent of restoring credibility to the 
capital markets.  This paper has described several of these reactionary movements and the 
ideological claims that have been advanced.  These claims are generally supportive of the 
increasing confidence in the capital markets in order to facilitate and maintain the capitalist 
system.  However, beyond these claims, the authors of SOX intended the law to be a progressive 
piece of legislation which would contribute to increased levels of transparency in financial 
reporting and a greater level of independence for auditors.  These goals may be viewed as self-
serving measures intended to protect the interests of capital, but they can also be seen as 
beneficial to society in a larger sense.  Credible financial reporting and independence of auditors 
helps to provide greater societal control over corporations.  Without explicit multinational 
structures to reign in corporate power, it is difficult to conceive of effective control mechanisms 
without effective systems of financial reporting and corporate governance.  This is the overall 
importance of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. 
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TABLE 1 
SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
 
Title  Section Provision 
I  Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
 
101 Creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
 
 
102 
Requires public accounting firms to register with the PCAOB if 
they audit companies that have publicly traded securities (SEC 
registrants). 
 
 
103 
Authorizes the PCAOB to issue auditing standards, quality control 
standards and ethics standards for registered public accounting 
firms. 
 
104 Requires quality control inspections of public accounting firms 
registered with the PCAOB. 
 
 
 
105 
Provides for sanctions against registered public accounting firms 
for violations of rules or standards.  Penalties may include 
temporary or permanent suspension of practice, fines, or censure. 
 
 
 
 
106 
Specifies that if a foreign public accounting firm audits an SEC 
registrant) it must register with the PCAOB in the same manner as a 
domestic firm.  This provision also includes foreign public 
accounting firms that audit a subsidiary of an SEC registrant. 
 
107 Provides for SEC oversight of the PCAOB. 
 
108(b) Provides for recognition of FASB accounting standards by the SEC. 
 
 
108(d)  
Requires the SEC to report on the feasibility of adopting a 
principles-based accounting system. 
 
 
109 
Specifies that the PCAOB and the FASB will be supported by fees 
charged to SEC registrants.  
II  Auditor Independence 
 
 
201 
Lists 7 types of services that public accounting firms are prohibited 
from  providing to clients that are SEC registrants. 
 
 
202 
Requires all audit and non-audit services to be pre-approved by the 
audit committee of the SEC registrant. 
 
 
203 
Requires that the lead audit partner of the public accounting firm 
must rotate off of the audit after 5 years. 
 
 
 
204 
Requires the public accounting firm to report accounting policies 
and practices and the firm’s preferred choices to the audit 
committee of the client. 
 
 
 
205 
Amends the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 to replace the 
term “independent public accountant” with “registered public 
accounting firm”. 
 
 
 
206 
Prohibits the CEO, CFO, Chief Accounting Officer or Controller of 
an SEC registrant to have been employed by the company’s auditor 
during a 1-year period preceding the audit. 
 
 
 
207 
Requires a study by the Government Accountability Office 
regarding the potential effects of requiring the mandatory rotation 
of audit firms. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
 
Title Section Provision 
III  Corporate Responsibility 
 
301 Requires each member of an audit committee to be independent. 
 
 
 
 
 
302 
Requires both the CEO and the CFO of the SEC registrant to certify 
that they have reviewed the annual report and that the report does 
not contain any untrue statement or omit any material facts and that 
the financial statements and disclosures fairly present in all material 
respects the operations and financial condition of the company. 
 
 
303 
Prohibits fraudulent influence, coercion, manipulation or 
misleading of the auditor. 
 
 
 
304 
Requires forfeiture of bonus by CEO and CFO if there is material 
misconduct resulting in violation of financial reporting 
requirements under the securities laws. 
 
 
306 
Prohibits purchase or sale of shares by officers and directors during 
periods when trading is not allowed by others.  
 
307 Requires attorneys to report material violations of securities laws. 
 
 
308 
Provides that civil penalties collected by the SEC may be paid to 
the victims of a violation. 
IV  Enhanced Financial Disclosures 
 
401(a) Financial reports must disclose all material correcting adjustments 
and all material off-balance sheet transactions. 
 
 
 
 
401(b)  
Pro forma financial information cannot contain an untrue statement 
or omit to state a material fact that would make the pro forma 
financial information misleading.  Pro forma information must be 
reconciled with GAAP. 
 
401(c) Requires the SEC to study off-balance sheet disclosure rules. 
 
 
402 
Prohibits the SEC registrant from making a loan to a director or 
officer. 
 
403 Requires the reporting of related party transactions to the SEC. 
 
 
 
404 
Requires management to issue an annual report which assesses the 
effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the 
company. 
 
 
406 
Requires SEC registrants to disclose whether they have adopted a 
code of ethics for senior financial officers. 
 
407 Requires SEC registrants to disclose whether at least 1 member of 
its audit committee is a financial expert (as defined by the law). 
 
408 Requires enhanced disclosures in financial reports. 
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TABLE 1 (continued) 
SUMMARY OF KEY PROVISIONS OF THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 
 
Title Section Provision 
V  Analyst Conflicts of Interest 
 
 
501 
Requires securities exchanges to adopt conflict of interest rules for 
research analysts. 
VI  Resources and Authority 
 
601 Increased SEC budgetary appropriation and number of employees. 
 
 
602 
Allows the SEC to censure or bar a person from practice before the 
SEC for violation of professional standards, rules and regulations. 
VII  Studies and Reports 
 
 
701 
Requires the GAO to study the effects of consolidation in the 
practice of public accounting. 
 
 
702 
Requires the SEC to study the role and function of credit rating 
agencies in the function of securities markets. 
 
 
703 
Requires the SEC to study how many public accountants and other 
securities professionals have violated laws. 
 
704 Requires SEC to study SEC enforcement actions. 
 
 
 
705 
Requires the Comptroller General of the United States to student 
whether investment banks assisted public companies in 
manipulating earnings. 
VIII  Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability 
 
801 Name: The Corporate and Criminal Fraud Accountability Act of 
2002 
 
 
 
802 
Makes it a felony to destroy documents or to impede or obstruct a 
federal investigation.  Auditors are required to maintain all work 
papers for five years. 
 
803 Protects whistleblowers. 
 
804 Increases length of imprisonment for securities fraud up to 25 years. 
IX  White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancements 
 
901 Name: The White-Collar Crime Penalty Enhancement Act of 2002 
 
903  Maximum penalties for fraud increased to 20 years. 
 
904  Federal Sentencing guidelines to be revised. 
 
 
905 
Penalty for failure to certify financial statements set at up to 20 
years and $5,000,000 fine. 
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TABLE 2 
COMPARISON OF YEAR-ONE AND YEAR-TWO  
SECTION 404 IMPLEMENTATION COSTS   
AVERAGE PER COMPANY  
(ROUNDED)  
 
 Year Two 
in 000s ($) 
Year One 
in 000s ($) 
Percent 
Change 
Section 404 Audit Fees  1,570  2,020  -22.3%  
Internal Issuer and Third-Party 404 Costs  3,200  6,490  -50.7%  
Total Section 404 Costs  4,770  8,510  -43.9%  
Average Company Revenue  8,820,000  7,920,000   
Total Section 404 Costs as a Percentage of 
Revenue  
0.05%  0.11%   
Section 404 Audit Fees as a Percentage of 
Revenue  
0.02%  0.03%   
 
Source: CRA International (2006), page 10. 
 
